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the	view	 that	our	 tendencies	 to	use	 requesting	 as	 a	 form	of	 reason-
giving	are	culturally	relative	phenomena.1	Perhaps	this	view	itself	sup-


















































with	 distinctive normative force.	 Specifically,	 that	 distinctiveness	 from	
other	 forms	 of	 reason-giving	 derives	 from	 thinking	 of	 requests	 as	
uniquely	occupying	a	quadrant	in	the	chart	below	(fig.1).	Again,	whilst	
this	definition	is	stipulative,	I	also	believe	that	it	captures	the	heart	of	
























that	 includes	 requesting.	 I	 am	 sympathetic	 to	 Enoch’s	 picture	 and	 I	
will	try	to	illustrate	its	advantages,	but	I	will	also	argue	that	it	fails	to	
account	for	the	whole	triad	of	explananda	when	it	comes	to	requests.	
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quadrant	 represents	 interpersonally	given	 reasons	 that	are	both	cre-
ated	and	obligatory,	which	I	suggest	might	be	the	conceptual	heart	of	
the	notion	of	 a	 command.4	Beneath	 that,	 in	 the	bottom-left,	 are	 rea-
sons	that	are	also	obligatory,	but	which	are	not	newly	created.	In	these	














border	 between	demands	 and	 commands	 is	 rather	 blurrier	 than	 I	 am	 sug-
gesting:	that	sometimes	demands	create	new	reasons.	Let	me	try	to	allay	this	
concern	 through	 an	 example.	Consider	 a	 group	of	 employees	 in	 a	 factory	
that	produces	 supermarket	 sandwiches,	who,	 after	 a	breakdown	 in	official	
negotiations,	down	their	aprons	and	march	to	the	management	corridor	of	








normative	 fact	 that	 they	had	hitherto	overlooked.	Alternatively,	one	 could	













Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	 conceptual	 terrain	 for	 interpersonal	 rea-
sons	—	the	kind	of	 reasons	 that	one	person	 is	 able	 to	give	 to	 anoth-
er	person,	intentionally,	in	an	act	of	address,	thereby	applying	some	
rational	 force	 for	or	 against	 any	particular	 action.3	 The	 chart	 carves	
the	 terrain	 along	 two	 dimensions:	whether	 the	 reason	 presented	 is	
thereby	 created,	 and	 whether	 it	 is	 obligatory.	 As	 such,	 the	 top-left	
3.	 Note	that	in	categorising	ways	of	giving	reasons	for	action,	this	chart	does	not	
purport	to	categorise	ways	of	giving	reasons	for	belief.






















































Similarly,	 suppose	 that	 a	 few	 hours	 later,	 Bronwen	 notices	 that	

































reasons	 for	and	against	helping.	That	 is	 to	say,	 from	Ffion’s	perspec-
tive	it	makes	a	difference	that	Sioned	asks	for	her	help.	Since	in	the	







be	 more	 than	 merely	 epistemic.	 Somehow	 or	 other,	 this	 utterance	
is	creating	a	new	reason	for	Ffion	to	commit	to	the	campaign	itself.11 

























































obligation	 to	 respect	 all	 people	does	not	 simply	pertain	 to	perform-
ing	 the	deeds	of	 respecting	 their	dignity.	Rather,	 the	obligation	also	
pertains	 to	 the	 attitudes	 that	we	hold.	We	must	 actually	 respect	 oth-
ers’	dignity,	which	means,	inter alia,	believing	that	their	dignity	is	wor-
thy	of	respect	and	perhaps	harbouring	at	least	some	minimal	degree	
of	emotional	connection	with	 their	dignity	—	a	disposition	 to	 regard	
threats	 to	 their	 dignity	with	 concern,	 for	 instance.	Holding	 the	 atti-
tude	of	respect	towards	others	is	holding	an	obligatory	interpersonal	
valuing-attitude.13
Indeed,	 respect	might	be	an	attitude	 that	we	are	each	obliged	 to	
hold	 towards	 everyone	else,	 but	 there	 are	other	obligatory	 interper-
sonal	 valuing-attitudes,	 ones	 which	 are	 specific	 to	 one’s	 particular	
relationships	with	others.	Often,	 for	 instance,	one	is	obliged	to	hold	
the	attitudes	of	deference	towards	one’s	elders,	of	sympathy	towards	
one’s	 young	 children,	 of	 solidarity	with	one’s	 friends	 and	 comrades.	
In	entering	into	relationships	with	others,	one	accrues	obligations	to	
hold	certain	attitudes	 towards	 them.	And	 the	obligatoriness	of	 such	
















































At	 this	 point,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 the	 distinction	 between	 being	
obliged	to	do	something,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	having	reason	 to	do	















17.	 As	 it	happens,	 I	do	also	 in	 fact	 think	 that	 there	 is	 such	a	 thing	as	 rational	





18.	 What	 characterises	 obligations	 is	 a	matter	 of	 some	 controversy.	One	 influ-





one	account	or	 another,	 so	 long	as	 they	 are	 all	 compatible	with	 a	 general	
















necessarily	be	 the	 latter	kind,	not	 the	 former.	Various	qualities	may	
play	a	role	in	leading	us	to	place	value	in	others,	or	in	vindicating	in	
















respect	 that	 persons	 can	 enjoy	 from	one	 another,	where	 “there	 can	be	no	
































Enoch	 proposes	 to	 explain	 the	 normative	 power	 that	 people	 have	
to	give	practical	reasons	 ‘robustly’.	There	 is,	 though,	a	problem	with	
this	explanation	when	it	 is	brought	to	bear	on	requests.	 I	will	 try	to	
20.	For	an	elaboration	on	this	kind	of	understanding	of	internalism,	see	(Markov-
its,	2014);	for	its	classic	source,	see	(Williams,	1981,	p.	102).
21.	 Interesting	 though	 such	 consequences	 may	 be,	 discussing	 them	 properly	
must	remain	a	matter	for	another	time.
illustrates	 the	 divide	 between	 obligatory	 and	 discretionary	 interper-
sonal	valuing-attitudes.	Suppose	that	Charlene	is	obliged	to	hold	an	
attitude	 of	 deference	 towards	her	 professor,	Dominique.	 If	 she	 fails	
to	hold	that	attitude	she	will	be	doing	something	wrong.	This	failure	
may	manifest	 itself	 in	 certain	 deeds	—	an	 insufficiently	 deep	 bow,	 a	
lacklustre	 display	 of	 courtesy,	 perhaps	—	and	 by	 extension,	 these	
deeds	 too	are	wrong.	By	contrast,	 there	 is	nothing	wrong	about	 fail-
ing	to	feel	heartfelt	affection	for	someone,	or	genuine	admiration,	or	
real	pity.	It	is	intrinsic	to	the	very	notions	of	these	attitudes	that	one	















In	 this	section,	 I	have	been	trying	 to	express	an	 idea	 that	 I	 think	
comes	naturally	when	we	think	about	the	reasons	that	we	have	to	act	
in	the	interests	of	others.	That	is,	I	have	tried	to	establish	—	in	line	with	





19.	 For	 a	 further	 defence	of	 the	 view	 that	 there	 cannot	 be	 a	 duty	 to	 love,	 see	
(Driver,	2014).	Not	everyone	holds	this	view,	however,	see	(Liao,	2006).









her	 with	 the	 campaign,	 she	 triggered	 something	 like	 the	 following	
conditional	reason:	 ‘If	requested	to	do	so	by	Sioned,	Ffion	has	(non-





been	made	 for	 the	difference	between	 robust	 reason-giving,	on	 the	
one	hand,	and,	on	the	other,	the	variety	of	other	ways	in	which	non-












acknowledges	 the	 conceptual	possibility	of	 robust	 reason-giving	 that	does	
not	 trigger	a	prior	 reason	but	 really	creates	a	wholly	new	reason.	Thus,	di-
vine	command	theorists	may	believe	that	the	obligatoriness	of	a	command	





































sons	work	by	realising the non-normative antecedents	of	conditional	rea-
sons	that	hold	true	independently.











existence;	 they	are	 in	 some	sense	 there	already,	before	—	or	at	 least	
at	—	the	moment	of	a	request	being	made.	By	positing	the	existence	
of	such	conditional	reasons,	the	theory	can	explain	in	principle	how	










of	 Sioned’s	 request	 illustrated	 earlier,	 it	 seems	 certain	 that	 it	 is	 pos-
sible	for	requests	to	make	an	impact	on	the	normative	terrain	—	to	do 
something,	 that	 is	—	even	when	all	 the	 relevant	normative	and	non-






The	 third	of	 the	 triad	of	 explananda	was	 that	 the	 reasons	 that	 re-
quests	create	are	in	some	sense	discretionary.	How	does	the	theory	of	






















are	 at	 issue	—	including	 commands	 and	 requests.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	
will	focus	in	on	requests	and	inspect	the	status	and	normative	quality	


















the	 employer’s	 authority	 over	 her	 employee	 stems	 from	 an	 explicit	
contract;	 the	 restaurant	 customer’s	 from	an	 implicit	 one;	 and	 so	on.	
To	be	sure,	in	any	given	case,	it	may	be	far	from	straightforward	to	de-
termine	whether	the	putative	authority	is	in	fact	well	grounded.	What	
is	 straightforward,	 though,	 is	 that	 when	 reasons	 are	 robustly	 given	
in	commands,	they	are	always	grounded	in	this	kind	of	authority.	 In	


























This	 is	 quite	 a	 serious	 concern.	 It	 is	 a	 fundamental	 quality	 of	 re-
quests	 that	 acceding	 to	 them	 is	 distinctively	 a	matter	 of	 discretion.	
Asking	 someone	 to	 do	 something	 is	 an	 interesting,	 special	 form	 of	
reason-giving	precisely	because	in	so	asking,	one	intends	for	the	other	
to	treat	this	request	as	a	reason,	but	not	for	them	to	treat	it	as	itself	con-





It	might	be	 thought	 that	Enoch’s	account	as	 it	 stands	can	accom-
modate	the	discretionary	quality	of	requests	simply	by	distinguishing	








But	 this	 line	 of	 defence,	 though	 initially	 tempting,	 fails	 on	 two	
fronts.	First,	 it	 simply	begs	 the	question.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 to	be	merely	
pro tanto,	 rather	 than	obligatory,	 is	part	of	what	 it	 is	 for	a	request	 to	
23.	 Thanks	to	Daniel	Viehoff	for	pressing	this	point.
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depends	 on	 appropriate	mutual	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 intention	







the	addressor	 intends	the	request	as	an	appeal	 to	an	 item	in	the	ad-
dressee’s	own	discretionary	value-outlook.	If	there	is	no	such	item,	if	
the	addressee	does	not	place	any	discretionary	value	in	the	person	of	
the	addressor,	 then	the	request	 fails	 to	create	a	reason.	Moreover,	 it	











In	 response	 to	 these	 difficulties,	 I	 have	 a	 sympathetic	 proposal	 to	
amend	 the	 account	 of	 robust	 reason-giving	 as	 it	 applies	 to	 request-

















ee	—	if	 condition	 (ii)	 is	not	met	—	then	 the	 request	 fails	entirely	and	
24.	A	 question	 that	might	 be	 raised	 to	my	 view	 (and	 indeed	has	 been,	 by	Al-



















of	 robust	 reason-giving	with	 the	capacity	 to	explain	 the	normativity	
of	 exchanges	 like	 Carrie	 and	 Anita’s,	 of	 entreaties	 in	 general.	 This	
advantage	 is	pertinent	because,	as	 it	 seems	 to	me,	 the	boundary	be-





outlook	 also	 being	 required.	 For	 example,	 Gwen	 and	 her	 younger	
sister	Cat	are	being	 looked	after	by	 their	babysitter,	Wynn.	Gwen	 is	
extremely	enamoured	of	Wynn	—	thinks	the	world	of	her	—	so	when	
Wynn	asks	Gwen	to	go	and	read	Cat	a	bedtime	story,	 there	really	 is	
no	 question	 of	whether	 she	 places	 sufficient	 discretionary	 value	 in	
Wynn	for	 the	request	 to	be	reason-giving.	This	 is	a	clear-cut	case	of	
a	run-of-the-mill	request.	But	I	suggest	that	often,	depending	on	the	

















ing	made	here,	 consider	 the	 case	of	 entreaties.	 I	 shall	 use	 the	 term	
‘entreaties’	to	refer	to	a	subset	of	requests	in	which,	prior	to	the	request	
being	made,	condition	(ii)	is	not	met:	the	addressee	does	not	yet	place	













asks	whilst	 looking	directly	 into	Anita’s	eyes.	 In	 the	moment	before	





































discretionary	 quality	 of	 a	 request	 is	 explicable	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 com-
municated	acknowledgement	of	the	optional	or	discretionary	force	of	














In	 this	 section	 I	 have	 presented	 an	 amendment	 to	 the	 theory	 of	







5. The pragmatics of discretion28
A	central	merit	of	 the	account	 that	 I	 am	proposing	 is	 its	 capacity	 to	
explain	the	sense	in	which	the	reasons	presented	in	requests	are	dis-
cretionary.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	normative	 role	 played	by	
discretionary	 interpersonal	valuing-attitudes	 in	grounding	 those	 rea-
sons.	As	 such,	one	way	 to	 challenge	 this	 account	would	be	 to	offer	
an	explanation	of	that	discretionary	quality	without	recourse	to	such	
interpersonal	valuing-attitudes.	A	rival	explanation	of	exactly	this	sort	
is	 to	be	 found	 in	 the	approaches	by	speech	act	 theorists	 to	 the	phe-
nomena	of	requesting.
Such	approaches	tend	to	follow	John	Searle	(1969,	p.	62)	in	think-
ing	of	 requesting	as	expressing	a	desire	of	 the	addressor	 for	 the	ad-
dressee	 to	 undertake	 an	 action.	As	 such,	 these	 approaches	 concern	
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ments.	That	prior	 conditional	 reason	 is	of	 the	general	 form:	Person	
A	has	a	reason	to	Φ	if	requested	to	do	so	by	Person	B	and	if	Person	
A	places	 sufficient	discretionary	value	 in	Person	B.	As	 such,	 the	 rea-
sons	presented	in	requests	make	essential	reference	to	the	discretion-
ary	value	outlooks	of	their	addressees.	In	particular,	they	rely	on	the	
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